In finance,
systemic risk is the risk of collapse of an entire financial system or
entire market, as opposed to risk associated with any one individual entity,
group or component of a system, that can be contained therein without harming
the entire system. It can be defined as "financial system
instability, potentially catastrophic, caused or exacerbated by idiosyncratic
events or conditions in financial intermediaries". It refers to the risks
imposed by interlinkages and interdependencies in a system or
market, where the failure of a single entity or cluster of entities can cause a
cascading failure, which could potentially
bankrupt or bring down the entire system or market. It is also sometimes
erroneously referred to as "systematic
risk".
Systemic risk
has been associated with a bank run which has a cascading effect on other banks which are
owed money by the first bank in trouble, causing a cascading
failure. As depositors sense the ripple effects of default, and liquidity
concerns cascade through money markets, a panic can spread through a market,
with a sudden flight to quality, creating many sellers but
few buyers for illiquid assets. These inter-linkages and the potential
"clustering" of bank runs are the issues which policy makers consider when
addressing the issue of protecting a system against systemic risk. Governments and market monitoring institutions (such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), or SEBI in India and central banks
often try to put policies and rules in place with the justification of
safeguarding the interests of the market as a whole, claiming that the trading
participants in financial markets are entangled in a web of dependencies
arising from their inter-linkage. In simple English, this means that some
companies are viewed as too big and too interconnected to fail. Policy makers
frequently claim that they are concerned about protecting the resiliency of the
system, rather than any one individual in that system.
Systemic risk
should not be confused with market or price risk as the latter is specific to
the item being bought or sold and the effects of market risk are isolated to
the entities dealing in that specific item. This kind of risk can be mitigated
by hedging an investment by entering into a mirror trade.
Insurance is
often easy to obtain against "systemic risks" because a party issuing
that insurance can pocket the premiums, issue dividends to shareholders, enter
insolvency proceedings if a catastrophic event ever takes place, and hide
behind limited liability. Such insurance, however, is not effective for the
insured entity.
One argument
that was used by financial institutions to obtain special advantages in
bankruptcy for derivative contracts was a claim that the market is both
critical and fragile.
Systemic risk
can also be defined as the likelihood and degree of negative consequences to
the larger body. With respect to federal financial regulation, the systemic risk of
a financial institution is the likelihood and the degree that the institution's
activities will negatively affect the larger economy such that unusual and
extreme federal intervention would be required to ameliorate the effects.
A general
definition of systemic risk which is not limited by its mathematical approaches,
model assumptions or focus on one institution, and which is also the first
operationalizable definition of systemic risk encompassing the systemic
character of financial, political, environmental, and many other risks, was put
forth in 2010.